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A resource based interpretation of performance enhancing capital 
structure changes: The O.M. Scott LBO revisited 
 
Peter Wirtz Université Lumière (Lyon 2) 
 
 
Abstract 
The O.M. Scott case study published in 1989 in the Journal of Financial Economics has come to be a 
classic in illustrating the plausibility of some fundamental concepts that underpin mainstream models 
of the efficiency attributes of capital structure in modern corporate finance. In these models, high 
leverage traditionally appears as a strong incentive to refrain from sub-optimal investment behavior by 
self-interested managers. Thus reducing managerial agency cost has been considered as an essential 
driver of enhanced value in much of financial modeling. In the present paper, we attempt a somewhat 
different, albeit complementary, mainly resource based interpretation of the very rich empirical material 
contained in Baker and Wruck (1989). In fact, a close reading of the case suggests that the observed 
significant increase in operating performance post-LBO was to a great extent the consequence of the 
yet unexplored cognitive changes implied by switching dominant shareholders. Namely, we find that 
value at O.M. Scott was essentially increased by (1) a significant reduction in what may be termed 
cognitive agency costs while (2) the new dominant shareholder contributed substantial cognitive value 
by stimulating and advising a dynamic learning process leading to enforced managerial capabilities, 
especially with respect to more effective routines of cash management. 
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Key words  capital structure  cognitive agency costs  cognitive value  managerial agency costs 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 2
In a well documented case study published in 1989 in the Journal of Financial Economics, 
Baker and Wruck described the case of the leveraged buyout of the O.M. Scott and Sons 
Company and the resulting substantial  increase in operating performance. The analytic focus 
of their article may be described as an effort to apply the conceptual tool box of traditional 
positive agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) to establish a plausible link 
between the incentive structure resulting from an increase in leverage and enhanced firm 
value. In an attempt to fully understand the nature and behavioral influence of incentives, 
Baker and Wruck achieved an in-depth analysis of the underlying (contractual) mechanisms. 
In doing so, the authors not only confirmed some of  PAT’s (positive agency theory’s) most 
fundamental reasoning, but also helped to put some flesh on the bones of the theoretical 
structure of one of the most prominent approaches modern corporate finance has to propose to 
come to grips with the classical capital structure puzzle raised by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). 
While we basically agree with the major conclusions concerning the positive impact of the 
LBO’s incentive structure on long-term value creation by imposing constraints on 
management limiting the possibilities of sub-optimal myopic behavior, we contend that there 
is more to it than merely financial discipline. Especially, a close reading of the O.M. Scott 
case raises the central question of where the superior value creation capability actually came 
from in the first place, rather than of how to simply reduce managerial agency costs of 
conflicting interests in the traditional sense (Berle and Means, 1932). In fact, one of the 
shortcomings of traditional agency theory’s financial modeling, when considered in its most 
rudimentary form, lies in its assuming opportunities for value creation to be given with 
objectively communicable performance parameters1 (Jensen, 1986)2. In doing so, the financial 
models gain analytical sharpness. Narrowly focusing on problems of agency costs allows for 
parsimonious explanations of efficient capital structure changes in situations where improper 
alignment of incentives and failure in systems of control actually exist. However, reducing 
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agency costs is but one possible, albeit potentially relevant, dimension along which to proceed 
in an effort to enhance value. 
With a longstanding tradition in strategy research, the resource based approach of the firm as 
pioneered by Penrose (1959) takes on a different perspective. In doing so, it allows for a 
genuine understanding of some significant sources of value which are neglected by traditional 
PAT. Hence we hold that to fully understand the enhanced operating performance post-LBO 
it is useful to complement the rather narrow agency theory explanation contained in Baker 
and Wruck with  resource based arguments, especially with respect to managerial cognition of  
productive opportunities (Barney, 1986) and the existence and development of firm-specific 
organizational capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2000). 
In the present paper, we will argue that the O.M. Scott case as reported in Baker and Wruck 
(1989) actually contains some yet under-exploited empirical facts consistent with a resource 
based perspective on changes in capital structure. Notably, we establish that, beside the 
incentives of high leverage, the change of dominant shareholders brought about by the LBO 
(1) reduced value destroying cognitive cost by conferring more “coordination control3” over 
internally generated resources on incumbent management and (2) simultaneously stimulated a 
learning process allowing for the dynamic adaptation of organizational capabilities (e.g. more 
efficient management of working capital by changed routines of production) to perceived 
changes of the firm’s environment4. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we briefly recall the principal events of 
the O.M. Scott case as well as the main conclusions drawn by Baker and Wruck. In the 
second section, the major shortcomings of traditional capital structure analysis as well as one 
possible way of pushing our understanding further will be discussed. Sections three and four 
highlight and reinterpret some of the empirical evidence contained in the O.M. Scott case 
concerning respectively the impact of varying degrees of cognitive cost and of learning new 
organizational capabilities. Section five concludes insisting on the complementary 
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contributions of  PAT and resource based theory to the understanding of the performance 
impact of capital structure changes.  
 
Principal Events around the O.M. Scott LBO 
 
The following is a brief summary of the most salient events as reported in Baker and Wruck 
(1989). At the time of the leveraged buyout, O.M. Scott was the largest producer of lawn care 
products in the United States. The company started off at the end of the nineteenth century as 
a specialist in the sale of farm crop seed, but reconverted itself at the beginning of the 
twentieth century when it commercialized weed-free lawn seed through the mail. In the 
nineteen-twenties, Scott came up with a series of product innovations, making it a first mover 
with respect to several new products which completed the range of the lawn market offer. 
With respect to capital structure, it should be noted that Scott began as a family business and 
was closely held for almost a century. A major change in capital structure came about in 
1971, when 100% of its stock was purchased by ITT, a widely diversified conglomerate. 
During the period of the conglomerate’s exclusive control, O.M. Scott management 
experienced significant restrictions with respect to capital resources. Internal funding was 
almost unavailable. In fact, the entire cash flow generated by the home lawn specialist was 
immediately transferred and brought under the conglomerate headquarters’ control. The latter 
attributed financial resources only as a function of a bureaucratically controlled and relatively 
rigid budget. In fact, Baker and Wruck (1989) state that the ITT control system “did not give 
[Scott’s] managers the flexibility [...] to use their specialized knowledge of the business [...]” 
(p. 177) Lacking access to internal finance, Scott management was often unable to make the 
necessary investments to respond to its expert view of changed market conditions. Actually, at 
a certain point of time, “Scott managers found their requests for capital funds were routinely 
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denied.” (p. 184) They were thus strongly limited in their possibility to develop the business, 
in the way they perceived as being “optimal”. 
This frustration with being unable to deploy a strategy they felt was best suited to enhance 
Scott’s development may explain one early attempt made by incumbent managers to become 
themselves the controlling shareholders. Several years before the actual LBO realized in 1986 
by Clayton and Dubilier, O.M. Scott managers tried to directly negotiate a management 
buyout with ITT (p. 173). But, at that time, the proposal did not match with ITT’s own 
corporate objectives. It was seen as posing a conflict of interest. 
Major change came in early 1985, when ITT, confronted with declining performance, found 
that to enhance efficiency it would be necessary to become a specialist of only a few 
businesses and thus to sell off assets that did not correspond to what was henceforth 
considered to be its specialties (telecommunications, insurance, high technology). Scott 
appeared on the list of companies to be divested.  At that time, the controlling shareholder’s 
(ITT’s) interest changed from exerting ongoing (coordination) control over cash flow 
generated by Scott to simply selling off the company to the highest bidder. The latter 
happened to be a specialist in the business of leveraged buyouts, Clayton and Dubilier (C&D), 
who became the new dominant shareholder by virtue of an LBO realized in December 1986. 
The transaction was essentially financed by debt, leaving Scott with a financial structure of 
only 9% equity (p. 165). The latter was essentially controlled by C&D with a large majority 
of 61.4%5. The high degree of leverage imposed minimal cash flow requirements, forcing 
Scott to develop skills of more efficient cash management. But it is worth noting that, in spite 
of the existence of debt covenants, management’s discretion over the use of internally 
generated funds eventually in excess of the requirements of the debt repayment schedule 
found itself actually enlarged as a result of the special relationship with the new dominant 
shareholder. In fact, under C&D’s ownership control, the incumbent management was granted 
greater autonomy than under ITT to invest in the activities it felt best suited to assure the 
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company’s future development. That is to say, C&D highly valued the incumbent 
management’s specific expertise. 
If C&D was able to put in the highest bid for the acquisition of shares, this is most probably 
due to this actor perceiving the highest value creation potential in O.M. Scott compared to the 
other candidates for becoming controlling shareholders6. This a priori perception seems 
consistent with Baker and Wruck’s (1989) observation of a significant actual increase in 
operating performance post LBO. The authors contend that, in this case, improved 
performance can be explained in a satisfactory manner by traditional PAT-reasoning. They 
“interpret their results as being consistent with an agency theory of the firm in which high 
leverage and managerial equity ownership lead to improved incentives and consequently 
improved operating performance.” (p. 166, 167) Note that this traditional interpretation’s 
emphasis lies on incentive alignment by granting an equity share to management (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and on discipline by imposing constraints on managerial discretion through 
imposing a rigid debt repayment schedule (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). O.M. Scott’s post-
LBO capital structure is thus seen as enhancing value by reducing agency costs in essentially 
two ways. Management’s equity share tends to align pursuit of personal interest by managers 
with shareholder interest. However, interest alignment of this sort remains imperfect and is 
thus further enhanced by the burden of high leverage which acts as a limit on free cash flow 
available for sub-optimal investment (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 172). In a way consistent 
with a later study by Stulz (1990), Baker and Wruck (1989) recognize however that not 
having enough cash flow can also be a problem in that it prevents management from 
undertaking all potentially available positive NPV projects. Consequently, the authors argue 
that this potential cause of underinvestment has been resolved in the Scott case by the very 
nature of the debt covenants which assure the availability of just enough internal funding 
while simultaneously cutting down excess cash flow. In the authors’ own words “the 
company’s high leverage combined with covenants and management equity ownership 
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provided managers with the incentive to generate the cash required to meet the debt payments 
without bleeding the company.” (p. 175, 176, emphasis added)  
  
Major Shortcomings of Explanations Drawn from Traditional Capital 
Structure Analysis 
 
What is rather striking in Baker and Wruck’s (1989) interpretation of their empirical material 
is the fact that the specific (cognitive) role of the new dominant shareholder, in this case the 
private equity firm, is not well explored. This may be explained in terms of traditional agency 
theory’s almost exclusive analytical focus on the widely held managerial firm (Berle and 
Means, 1932), where costs due to the pursuit of managerial self-interest are potentially 
pervasive7. In such a context, substantial gains may be expected by discipline and incentives 
leading to a decrease in agency costs in a traditional sense8. The relevance of mainstream 
explanations of capital structure thus really depends on the significance of managerial agency 
costs. However, the latter is most likely to be strongly reduced under a controlling dominant 
shareholder. In other words, ways of limiting managerial agency costs in the traditional sense 
may only significantly contribute to enhance value, where those problems are the main source 
of inefficiency in the first place. O.M. Scott never having been a managerial firm stricto 
sensu
9
, there may be some doubt concerning an explanation where the decrease in managerial 
agency costs, albeit present, is the only or even the most important driver of value. 
In fact, a close reading of the O.M. Scott case suggests that we can gain further insight by 
analyzing this specific LBO-transaction not so much in terms of reducing agency costs, but 
rather in terms of “transaction value”. According to the latter approach, “a wide variety of 
formal interorganizational arrangements is more a function of anticipated value gains, rather 
than anticipated losses due to the cost of constraining opportunism.” (Zajac and Olsen, 1993, 
p. 132) 
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A major difficulty of mainstream capital structure analysis in coming to grips with the 
creation of value is its supposing the range of possible value gains to be given, very much like 
a menu from which to choose. In fact, only to the extent that all possible positive NPV 
projects are known is the notion of free cash flow with the related managerial agency costs 
(Jensen, 1986) relevant. The problem of value then becomes one of discipline only. This 
mainly disciplinary perspective widely ignores the significant role of special productive skills 
as a distinct source of value. Even in those contributions to PAT where specific knowledge 
features explicitly (Jensen and Meckling, 1992), the analytical focus is on monitoring as well 
as reward and punishment and, thus, on discipline rather than on the distinct role of 
competence. 
Because in a real-world setting the development of cognition and related capabilities follows 
path-dependent learning processes (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), certain productive skills are 
highly idiosyncratic and cannot easily be communicated. Consequently, one important 
problem to solve in an effort to better understand the creation of value likely concerns 
cognitive asymmetry linked to the construction of yet unrecognized productive opportunities 
and the possession of special productive skills necessary to exploit these opportunities. 
Cognitive asymmetry pertaining to methods of efficiently coordinating production activities is 
however distinct in nature from what promoters of agency theory commonly have in mind 
when they speak of asymmetric information10. Thus, traditional PAT seems insufficiently 
equipped to come to grips with enhanced performance in terms of the special productivity 
furnished by the specific knowledge and skill base of a closely cooperating (management) 
team. In fact, while a case was made for special productivity of this sort in Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), one very important predecessor of agency theory, its sources were not 
explicitly discussed (Demsetz, 1988, p. 152). Interestingly, Demsetz’s later attempt to explore 
deeper into these sources of superior performance brought him very close to a Penrosian and 
resource based perspective. Consider the following extracts. 
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“Productivity may be affected by considerations that are not plausibly included in these [agency11] cost 
categories. Each firm is a bundle of commitments to technology, personnel, and methods, all contained 
and constrained by an insulating layer of information that is specific to the firm, and this bundle cannot 
be altered or imitated easily or quickly.” (Demsetz, 1988, p. 148) 
The cognitive dimension of enhanced performance and the conceptual proximity with Penrose 
(1959) becomes even clearer in the following: 
“Particularly important in determining [...] benefits are knowledge-based considerations. Continuing 
association of the same persons makes it easier for firm-specific and person-specific information to be 
accumulated [...]. Knowledge about the objectives and organization of the firm is learned ‘cheaply’ 
through continuing association, and so is knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of the persons 
involved in this association.” (Demsetz, 1988, p. 160) 
 
More recently, in an attempt to overcome the limits of mainstream theories of corporate 
finance12 in explaining the efficiency attributes of different configurations of capital structure, 
Charreaux (2002) proposed to integrate agency theory and a more cognitive approach, 
essentially inspired by evolutionary economics (Alchian, 1950; Nelson and Winter, 1982) and 
research in strategic management of the resource based and organizational capabilities kind 
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). He did so 
by introducing a new conceptual distinction between different types of agency costs and by 
adding the concept of “cognitive value” to PAT-reasoning. In his model, AMI (informational 
managerial agency cost) denotes agency costs in the traditional sense, that is to say due to the 
pursuit of objectively conflicting interests being made possible by asymmetric information 
when capital is widely dispersed. Informational agency costs also exist when shareholdings 
are closely controlled, but are likely to be less significant in that case. Their extent possibly 
depends on the characteristics of the dominant shareholder, especially with respect to his 
competence in controlling asymmetric information. There may, for example, be a difference 
in the intensity of informational agency costs between a firm having an industrial corporation 
as dominant shareholder (AMIIND) and another one being controlled by institutional 
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investors(AMIII). So much for the traditional agency costs. Charreaux (2002) then introduced 
the concept of cognitive agency costs (AMC). These result from diverging perceptions between 
management and shareholders as to the best opportunities for the creation of value. Such 
divergence is rooted in incongruent mental patterns13 and is likely to occur in a real-world 
setting where uncertainty is pervasive and new opportunities for the creation of value can 
sometimes be endogenously constructed by management itself14. In this context, AMC can be 
understood as an opportunity cost of management not being able to pursue a value creation 
strategy it subjectively perceives as “optimal”. This is most likely to be the case when owners 
do not understand management’s arguments (due to fundamentally different cognitive 
structures)15 while exerting strong control. Hence AMC should be more pervasive under certain 
dominant shareholders than when capital is widely dispersed. On the other hand, a new 
dominant shareholder may contribute valuable knowledge assets in the form of specific 
capabilities (e.g. C&D’s financial expertise with respect to cash management) which 
potentially make a significant contribution to the firm’s ability to create value16. Charreaux 
(2002) referred to these as sources of cognitive value (VC). He then developed a formal model 
which demonstrates the fashion in which a change in capital structure influences all three of 
the previously discussed dimensions (AMI , AMC and VC). 
Now consider the case of O.M. Scott. We contend that the LBO’s impact on value creation is 
best captured by the following inequality. 
VCC&D - (AMCC&D + AMIC&D) > VCITT - (AMCITT + AMIITT)    (1) 
In fact, by the time of the buyout, ITT contributed no specific cognitive value (VCITT = 0), 
whereas cognitive cost under this owner appeared to be relatively high. The LBO contributed 
new cognitive value (VCC&D > 0) while simultaneously reducing cognitive cost (AMCC&D < 
AMCITT) by granting management discretion over internal funding. This potentially created a 
free cash flow problem, which was however controlled by means of high leverage and 
contractual incentive alignment. Hence, we may reasonably suppose that, at worst, 
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informational agency cost remained unchanged (AMIC&D = AMIITT)17. Consequently, the 
preceding inequality becomes 
VCC&D  > AMCC&D - AMCITT         (2) 
, where the right-hand side takes on a negative value.  
VCC&D > - AMC         (3) 
VCC&D + AMC > 0         (4) 
Hence, the value created by the LBO was essentially the sum of C&D’s cognitive value to 
Scott and of a decrease in cognitive cost, which means that the most important drivers of 
value in this case were of a cognitive nature. 
In the following two sections, we turn to a discussion of the empirical evidence in line with 
these assertions. This will also allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms. 
 
Controlling Shareholder and Cognitive Cost 
 
The O.M. Scott case actually illustrates the existence of relatively high cognitive cost under 
the former owner (ITT) and the way such cost may be relieved by a new dominant 
shareholder. In fact, with ITT closely controlling the allocation of internal funding, cognitive 
cost was opportunity cost due to foregone activities which were perceived by experienced 
incumbent management as potential sources of value. 
According to Penrose (1959), the management team is a potentially valuable resource and an 
essential driver of a firm’s development. This is so because of the distinctive skills and 
understanding its members develop by constantly interacting inside of a particular 
organization18. Following such reasoning, managers’ contribution to value is essentially 
cognitive, because the executive team exerts significant influence on the type of productive 
services in which the firm’s specific bundle of resources is employed. In fact, beside the 
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intrinsic value of certain resources, what really makes a difference for the creation of value is 
management’s perception of yet unexploited productive opportunities (Barney, 1986) to 
which resources may “optimally” be channeled. Put differently, a key element in the creation 
of value is “coordination control” (Langlois and Robertson, 1995), the way in which 
productive activities and the corresponding resources are consistently organized. Competence, 
however, to exert such control in a value enhancing fashion is no publicly available 
commodity but depends on cognitive structure and skills which evolve, at least partially, in a 
process of experiential and organization-specific learning. The latter is local and path-
dependent, and the resulting knowledge is thus more or less difficult to transmit to outsiders 
to the extent that much learning of this kind is tacit in nature. 
In the O.M. Scott case, the inability to communicate management’s perception of specific 
productive opportunities to the ITT hierarchy which exerted tight coordination control over 
internal capital resources appears as a significant source of cognitive cost. As Baker and 
Wruck (1989) put it “ITT had created a control system that allowed headquarters to manage a 
vast number of businesses, but did not give managers the flexibility or incentive to use their 
specialized knowledge of the business to maximize the value of the division.” (p. 177, 
emphasis added) Hence, there were opportunity costs due to underexploited specialized 
knowledge of productive opportunities. Potentially value creating investments could not be 
undertaken because of the regular denial of requests for capital funds (p. 184). “Seitz [Scott’s 
CEO] had proposed that Scott enter [the] segment of the professional lawn care market for 
years, but ITT continually vetoed this initiative.” (p. 188) 
The change in capital structure brought about by the LBO considerably reduced cognitive 
costs of foregone investment opportunities. Hence, “[c]apital spending increased by 23% after 
the buyout.” (p. 165) At least two major investment projects were realized once the dominant 
shareholder had changed. Management’s perception of development opportunities led Scott to 
acquire Hyponex, another lawn care company, very present in the private label market. The 
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other strategic initiative was the development of the professional segment, which performed 
well with a growth rate of almost 40% per year (p. 188). 
A close reading of the Scott case suggests that the significant decrease in cognitive cost owed 
to Clayton and Dubilier’s recognition of the distinctive competence of the incumbent 
management team. Consequently, the new dominant shareholder granted greater coordination 
control to Scott managers concerning the way resources should be employed to serve specific 
productive opportunities. Consider the following. “C&D relied much more heavily [than ITT] 
on managers’ firm-specific knowledge, hence the incumbent management team was more 
valuable to the buyout firm. C&D was willing to pay managers more to reduce the risk of the 
managers quitting, and depriving Scott and C&D of this valuable knowledge.” (Baker and 
Wruck, 1989, p. 177, emphasis added) 
However, to state that cognitive cost was less under C&D than under ITT does not mean that 
there was no cognitive divergence at all between the Scott management and the private equity 
firm. In fact, Scott managers had no influence on the choice of the LBO specialist, and the 
latter was unilaterally imposed by ITT. Hence, at the beginning of their relationship, Scott 
management clearly felt some cognitive divergence with the C&D staff. This is explicitly 
reported in the following quotation from Tadd Seitz.  
“To be candid, they [C&D] weren’t our first choice. It wasn’t a question of their acumen, we just didn’t think 
we had the chemistry. But as we went through the controlled bid process, it was C&D that saw the greatest 
value in Scott.” (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 173) 
The use of the term “chemistry” most likely hints at the tacit dimension of mutual 
understanding. We think that this relative unease with the new dominant shareholder may 
reasonably be interpreted in terms of (at least slight differences) in mental structure. The 
ongoing relationship seems however to have deepened mutual understanding. In fact, quite to 
the contrary of their initial resentment, the Scott managers were actually encouraged to 
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exploit their very own firm-specific competence. Hence, C&D’s liaison partner with Scott, 
Henry Timnick, stated: 
“Tadd kept asking me ‘Can I do this? Can I do that?’ I told him, ‘You can do whatever you want so long as it 
is consistent with Scott’s overall strategy.’” (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 183) 
Thus, though not completely eliminated, cognitive cost was significantly reduced under C&D 
as dominant shareholder. The reason for this is implicit in the following remark by Martin 
Dubilier. 
“ITT challenges managers not to rock the boat, to make budget. We challenge managers to improve the 
business. Every company takes on the personality of its CEO.” (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 183) 
In this context, the composition of the board of directors can be seen as one possible way of 
managing cognitive divergence by gaining deeper mutual understanding in a process of 
ongoing interaction. This is so, because the board is a potentially important interface for 
active communication between managers and dominant shareholders. It is quite interesting to 
note that C&D’s approach to board composition was explicitly not one of conflicting interests 
and discipline, but rather one of professional expertise. 
“We will not put anyone on the board that the CEO doesn’t want, but we [C&D] have to approve them. We 
do not see board members as extensions of ourselves, but they are not to be cronies or local friends of the 
CEO. We want people with expertise that the CEO doesn’t have. The CEO should choose outside directors 
who are strong in areas in which he is weak.” (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 181) 
Hence, it seems plausible to conclude that C&D’s experience of the LBO business helped it 
develop specific routines (e.g. with respect to monitoring mechanisms) which help reduce 
cognitive cost through time by putting people on the board who are likely to understand each 
other, all the while contributing to the creation of cognitive value by ways of broadening 
management’s perception of opportunities19. Consequently, even though there was perhaps 
initially some cognitive cost in the relationship with the new dominant shareholder, this cost 
rapidly declined and was significantly lower than the pre-LBO level. 
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Developing Specific Capabilities of Cash Flow Management 
 
Reduced cognitive cost, as illustrated above, is however only one of two cognitive dimensions 
useful in an explanation of enhanced performance. We now turn to the second dimension 
identified in the Charreaux (2002) model: cognitive value. 
As suggested by Baker and Wruck (1989), the strain put on cash flow by increased leverage 
acted as an incentive to create value. While we agree with this general conclusion, we contend 
that the very nature and working of those incentives - that is to say the fashion in which they 
precisely operate - are actually underexplored in traditional agency theory. The latter’s 
explanation is essentially in terms of incentives for choosing exclusively positive NPV 
investments with fixed income streams from a pre-specified and well known set of 
opportunities. According to free cash flow theory, high leverage is a means of reducing 
incentives to over-invest. While this mechanism may be at work in some cases, we contend 
that it is not the most relevant for understanding O.M. Scott’s substantially increased 
operating performance. Here, incentives for value creation actually took on a different form 
which has so far received less attention from the financial community. In fact, we find that in 
the Scott LBO, high leverage acted as a stimulus (or incentive) for learning, very much in line 
with Winter’s (2000) characterization of the development of organizational capabilities as a 
satisficing search process. According to the latter analysis, overt learning to improve 
organizational capabilities takes place when there is a perceived gap between present 
capabilities and aspiration level. The intensive learning effort will most likely come to an end 
once the aspiration level is attained, which means that there is satisfaction with actual 
performance. Later on, satisficing search and related learning are possibly re-ignited when the 
aspiration level is shifted upwards. 
In the case of O.M. Scott, it appears that high leverage, by putting strain on cash flow, lead to 
an upward shift in management’s aspiration level with respect to capabilities related to the 
 16
generation of internal funding. Thus stimulating a specific learning process should 
consequently be considered as a significant driver of Scott’s enhanced operating performance. 
In this context, leverage acted as an incentive, not so much by preventing waste of free cash 
flow, but rather by shifting upwards aspiration levels, thus stimulating search for more 
efficient routines of cash management. 
In order to improve methods to gain better access to internal funding, Scott actually created a 
“working capital task force”, headed by John Wall, assistant treasurer. This working group 
“was charged with reducing working capital requirements by 42%, or $25 million, in two 
years.” (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 184) Note that this is a clear indication of a shift in 
aspiration levels. The result of such a shift is overt learning, as can be seen from the following 
account by Baker and Wruck (1989, p. 184): “The task force helped Scott managers learn to 
manage cash balances, production, inventories, receivables, payables, and employment levels 
more effectively.” (emphasis added) Consider also the following statement by John Wall, 
describing the way in which Scott tackled the challenge of controlling cash in order to meet 
debt service requirements. 
“In the first six months after the LBO we had to bring in a state-of-the-art cash management system for 
a business of this size. We shopped a lot of treasury management systems and had almost given up on 
finding a system that would simply let us manage our cash. We didn’t need a system that would keep 
track of our investment portfolios because we had $200 million borrowed. Finally, we found a product 
we could use. Under the LBO cash forecasting has become critical. I mean cash forecasting in the 
intermediate and long range. I don’t mean forecasting what is going to hit the banks in the next two or 
three days. We could always do that, but now we track our cash flows on a weekly basis and we do 
modeling on balance sheets, which allows us to do cash forecasting a year out.” (Baker and Wruck, 
1989, p. 185, emphasis added) 
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This account sheds some light on the temporal dimension of the search process and related 
learning. Intensive search stopped when the first satisfactory solution was found. This is 
clearly satisficing behavior20. 
In this process, C&D gave some advice. More importantly, the private equity firm had a 
decisive influence on aspiration levels21 and thus played a significant cognitive role. We 
interpret this as a manifestation of one particular mechanism by which a dominant shareholder 
may create cognitive value consistent with the model contained in Charreaux (2002). The 
following figure summarizes the underlying mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I Mechanisms underlying cognitive value creation at O.M. Scott 
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Conclusion 
 
A look on the curricula of the finance courses taught in several American business schools 
shows that the Baker and Wruck (1989) paper has become a widely utilized classroom classic 
to illustrate the workings of basic agency mechanisms22. While recent scandals such as Enron, 
Worldcom, and others illustrate the potential ongoing relevance of many arguments rooted in 
traditional agency theory, we contend that its applicability critically hinges on the presence of 
some typical characteristics of the managerial firm, especially with respect to capital 
structure. Where those characteristics are absent and shareholders are not widely dispersed, 
other factors than informational managerial agency costs are potentially more relevant in 
explaining performance changes. Indeed, in the present contribution we show that reduced 
agency costs in the traditional sense are far from being the most plausible explanation of O.M. 
Scott’s enhanced post-LBO operating performance. The case actually contains some very rich 
empirical material which is appealing to research integrating concepts from the fields of 
finance and strategy by considering not only financial discipline but also cognition and 
organizational capabilities. Following this line of reasoning, the evidence on O.M. Scott may 
plausibly be interpreted in terms of reduced cognitive cost and increased cognitive value 
brought about by changing the specific identity of the dominant shareholder. We actually find 
that, by granting greater coordination control over internal funding to incumbent management, 
Scott’s new dominant shareholder (C&D) considerably reduced cognitive cost in the form of 
foregone investment opportunities specifically identified as such by management’s 
idiosyncratic expertise. In addition, the new shareholder contributed special cognitive value 
by igniting and influencing a search and learning process for enhanced managerial 
capabilities.  
Without rejecting the major findings of PAT, we think that future research in corporate 
finance and governance has much to gain from efforts aiming at establishing more integrated 
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models which are open to the cognitive and resource based perspective. While mainstream 
approaches to capital structure issues are much concerned with the spoliation of owners and 
incentives to refrain from sub-optimal behavior within a range of given alternatives, the 
resource based view more closely focuses on the distinct contribution of a specific bundle of 
idiosyncratic resources to creating value as a response to endogenously constructed 
opportunities. Hence, the two approaches appear to be complementary, and the presence, in a 
real-world case, of elements from one or the other is most likely a matter of degree. The 
fundamental importance of aspects related to cognition and competence has not gone 
unrecognized by the most active promoters of agency theory themselves. In fact, the more 
recent developments in this field of research explicitly make room for issues of learning in an 
effort to create long-run value (Jensen, 2000; Wruck and Jensen, 1994). Our own paper 
should thus be understood as one tentative contribution to flesh out this basic insight by 
delving into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
 There may be information asymmetry, but this can in principle be relieved by proper, albeit costly, 
communication. That is, in traditional agency theory, information appears as unequally distributed but objective 
data. In this context, proper understanding of accessible information is not a problem, since subjective bias in 
perceiving  objective data is absent. At worst, information is incomplete, but its meaning is independent from the 
receiver’s mental structure. Hence, knowledge is implicitly assumed to be homogenous and not a matter of a 
firm’s idiosyncratic bundle of (cognitive) resources. Referring to Fransman’s (1998) distinction between 
information and knowledge, it can thus be stated that mainstream finance allows for information asymmetry 
while assuming potential knowledge asymmetry away. In fact, although Jensen and Meckling (1992) make 
extensive use of the term “knowledge”, they fail to draw a clear-cut distinction between the concepts of 
knowledge, information and data, often using them interchangeably. Consequently, in the Jensen and Meckling 
(1992) framework, the transfer of even specific knowledge is never technically impossible, although it might 
come at prohibitive costs. Thus, such an approach neglects the highly path dependent nature characteristic of the 
creation of certain specific competencies. 
2
 In fact, for large amounts of cash flow to qualify as “free cash flow” (Jensen, 1986), they must exceed the 
capital needs of all available positive NPV (net present value) projects. The relevance of the free cash flow 
hypothesis is thus conditioned on the absence of a firm-specific capability to endogenously create genuinely new  
opportunities for investment. If such possibilities of inventing opportunities exist, the explanatory power of the 
free cash flow model is considerably reduced. In fact, in that case, the access to high amounts of cash flow may 
actually be value enhancing. This is especially true in situations where the understanding of the investment 
project’s value creation potential is tacit and hard to communicate to external investors (Barney,  1986). 
3
 We borrow this term from Langlois and Robertson  (1995). The latter draw a conceptual distinction between 
“coordination control” pertaining to the organization of productive services and “ownership control” concerning 
the redistribution of income streams. 
4
 We subscribe to Tripsas and Gavetti’s (2000) view that cognition and capabilities are two distinct but 
interacting concepts, in the sense that management’s mental structures (mangerial cognition) may have a framing 
effect on the direction of search for new routine-like organizational capabilities. On the other hand, evolving 
capabilities which are to a substantial degree the result of much experiential and tacit learning also influence 
cognition in an ongoing dynamic process of interaction. As mental structures undergo changes, e.g. in the form 
of changed aspiration levels (Winter, 2000), management has an incentive to engage in learning of more 
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sophisticated capabilities. Hence, we shall argue that the contractual arrangements observed in the O.M. Scott 
LBO, by putting strain on cash flow, have elevated the aspiration level with respect to the effectiveness of 
methods used to generate internal funding, thus stimulating the learning of new cash-flow-management skills. As 
a matter of consequence, it appears that an LBO specialist (Clayton & Dubilier in the Scott case) may play a 
distinctive cognitive role. Our reinterpretation of the case will show that this cognitive role especially concerns 
the fixing of financial aspiration levels, the major orientations with respect to product market strategy being 
largely left to the incumbent management’s unique expertise and competence. 
5
 The remaining shareholders were debtholders (20.6%), Scott management and employees (17.5%), and Joseph 
Flannery (0.4%), a board member. 
6
 “[...] it was C&D that saw the greatest value in Scott.” (Tadd Seitz, president of Scott, quoted in Baker and 
Wruck, 1989, p. 173) 
7
 Mainstream financial models’ focus on the managerial firm is very explicit in Stulz (1990). Consider the 
following. “I analyze financing policies in a firm owned by atomistic shareholders who observe neither cash 
flows nor management’s investment decisions.” (p. 3, emphasis added) This suggests that the highest potential 
for agency costs in the traditional sense is typically attained when the cost of communicating specific 
information to shareholders is prohibitive. In that case “shareholders never believe management’s assertion that 
cash flow is too low [...]” (ibid, p. 4, emphasis added) This may especially be the case when shareholders are 
widely dispersed and do not share the same understanding of the economic context. Consequently, the problem 
is attenuated in a case where there are only few dominant shareholders. In such a setting, the costs of 
communicating with and of convincing investors are significantly reduced, as is perfectly illustrated by the case 
of O.M. Scott. “[...] if lenders can be convinced that a particular default was not the result of a financial problem, 
or that a new project prohibited by the covenants would increase firm value, they have an incentive to waive the 
default because it increases the value of their claim. [Recall that lenders also have a 20.6% stake in equity.] In 
fact, despite the covenant that prohibits mergers and the acquisition of assets, Scott’s lenders have recently 
agreed to allow Scott to acquire Hyponex [..] for $ 111 million.” (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 172, emphasis 
added) Hence, traditional problems of agency tend to be less salient when the number of investors is small and 
when investors are capable of understanding management’s arguments. 
8
 That is to say stemming from conflict due to objectively diverging interests. Note that this approach only holds 
in a world where knowledge about the set of all possible ways to create value is universal, though information 
about the execution of specific activities within this set is asymmetrically distributed. Hence, in mainstream 
explanations of capital structure there is risk but not uncertainty (Knight, 1921). 
9
 Rather than the reduction of agency costs by taking private a widely held firm, the issue raised in the O.M. 
Scott case really is one of understanding the rationale behind replacing one category of (dominant) shareholder 
by another. 
10
 Demsetz (1988, p. 148), among others, attracted attention to this unequal treatment of knowledge about 
productive opportunities and information about a manager’s opportunities for shirking in traditional theories of 
the firm. “Although information is treated as being costly for transaction or management control purposes, it is 
implicitly presumed to be free for production purposes. What one firm can produce, another can produce equally 
well [...]” 
11
 The term actually employed by Demsetz (1988) is “management cost”, but this term is comprehensive of 
agency costs in a traditional sense, which result from the management’s opportunity to engage in shirking under 
conditions of asymmetric information and inadequate incentive alignment. 
12
 Such efforts receive increasing support from scholars in the field of corporate finance (e.g. Zingales, 2000). 
13
 Conner and Prahalad (1996) also identified cognitive differences between actors as one potential source of 
“friction”. The latter term may reasonably be interpreted in terms of (cognitive) cost. Consider the following 
excerpt: “[...] truthful individuals honestly may disagree about the best present and future course of action for 
their business activities. Or, the parties may possess different mindsets generally. Discord fundamentally derives 
from personal knowledge that cannot be communicated fully to others at the time of the disagreement.” (p. 483, 
emphasis added) 
14
 With respect to the creation of new opportunities, consider the discussion of Hayek’s (1952) theory of human 
cognition contained in Langlois (1995, p. 6): “The [mental] map is in effect a complex modular construction set 
that allows the organism to generate novelty through recombination.” (emphasis added) 
15
 This appeared to be the case of O.M.Scott being controlled by ITT, where ITT’s exclusive control over 
internal funding frustrated management’s efforts in pursuing the best suited  development policy. 
16
 The recent empirical literature on venture capital finance (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Hellmann and Puri, 
2002) provides indirect evidence on the specific cognitive contribution of certain categories of shareholders. 
17
 However, if we follow Baker and Wruck’s (1989) mainstream interpretation of the case, AMIC&D should 
actually be (at least slightly) inferior to AMIITT. While that may be so, we shall demonstrate in the following 
sections that this alone is insufficient to explain the considerable increase in operating performance. 
18
 Also recall our earlier discussion of Demsetz (1988). 
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19
 “We have tried a number of board compositions and we found this to be the most effective. [...] Outsiders 
fortify the growth opportunities of the firm.” (Martin Dubilier quoted in Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 182, 
emphasis added) Note that the emphasized terms hint at a process of experiential learning which seems to be 
characteristic of the development of C&D’s own managerial capabilities. 
20
 In fact, “optimizing”, as opposed to “satisficing” (Simon, 1987), would have implied a thorough analysis of all 
existing cash management systems which has clearly not been done. 
21
 Consider the following excerpt from Baker and Wruck (1989): “In conversations with managers and C&D 
partners it became clear that C&D set higher standards for management performance than ITT. Increasing the 
minimum level of acceptable performance forces managers to work harder after the buyout or risk loosing their 
jobs. Indeed, managers did work harder after the buyout; there was general agreement that the management team 
was putting in longer working hours at the office. Several managers used the term ‘more focused’ to describe 
how their work habits had changed after the buyout.” (p. 176, emphasis added) The latter sentence suggests that 
managers, in addition to working harder, also worked differently. That is to say, managerial working routines 
changed, which is a manifestation of learning. This is important because, if working harder was the whole story, 
traditional PAT reasoning would suffice, as leisure time can be analyzed in terms of agency costs due to the 
pursuit of managers’ personal interest. Hence, what really makes a difference here is a qualitative change in 
work habits. 
22
 E.g. in a section committed to “Governance, Corporate Finance, and Organizational Performance”, Jensen et 
al. (1998) cite the O.M. Scott paper as an example. By introducing “a new genre of clinical papers”, it is clearly 
perceived as a pioneering and thus major contribution to the field. 
